Abstract-Active queue management (AQM) techniques are used to maintain congestion at network routers. Random Early Detection (RED) is the most used technique among the existing AQMs, as it can avoid network congestion at the early stage. The RED technique avoids congestion by prompting users to reduce their windows size when the queue average exceeds a predefined threshold. However, RED technique is unable to identify users who do not respond to these notifications, and therefore, RED drops all packets in the queue. This generates false positive alarms as packets of legal users will be dropped as well. This paper proposes a technique for monitoring gateways' queues and discarding only the misbehaving traffic. In particular, the proposed technique monitors users' behavior at the network gateways to identify the real sources of misbehaving traffic that causes the congestion on the network. Congested RED-gateways report the packet transfer rate (PTR) of end-users connected with them to service level agreement unit (SLA-unit). The SLAunit then discovers end-users who have exceeded their bandwidth shares predefined in the SLA as sources of the anomalous congestion on the network. The obtained results show that the proposed technique is promising in detecting and avoiding anomalous congestion without dropping normal traffic of legitimate end-users.
INTRODUCTION
Network congestion is a situation may occur when volume of transmitted traffic is greater than the capacity of the network. Network congestion degrades network performance and leads to critical problems such as packet loss and delay in data transmission. Congestion control is therefore required to prevent a traffic burst from occurring inside a network domain. Some applications may not follow the standard protocol description and attempt to steal resources, thus deteriorating quality of service (QoS) of the other applications. Efficient mechanisms are then required to recover from congestion and control flows accordingly. One goal of the Internet QoS is to control packet loss, which is achieved mainly through queue management. Packets get lost for two reasons: getting damaged in transit, or being dropped when the network is congested. As loss due to damage is rare, packet loss is most often a sign of network congestion [1] .
Some mechanisms are necessary both at the network endpoints and at intermediate routers to control and avoid network congestion. The TCP protocol is used to provide adaptive algorithms to monitor and control network congestion, such as random early detection (RED) technique, at the network endpoints. The goals are to achieve high throughput and low delay. The effectiveness can be measured by network power, which is the ratio of throughput to delay. Serious congestion greatly damages the network resources; therefore, stringent measures must be taken to avoid congestion. Congestion avoidance is a flow control mechanism. It monitors the utilization of the network resources (such as queues or memory buffers) and actively drops packets when the congestion deteriorates to prevent network overload [2] . Controlling the length of router queues according to [3] is done by dropping the packets whenever necessary or appropriate. The buffer space in the network is designed to absorb short-term data bursts rather than be continuously occupied. Also, limiting the queue size can help to reduce the packet delay bound.
Normally packets are dropped when the queue is full. The arriving packets are dropped (Drop Tail) or the packets that have been in the queue for the longest time are dropped (Drop Front). Sometimes, a randomly chosen packet is discarded from the queue. Two problems occur in the drop-on-full scenario: lock-out and full queues. The problem of lock-out arises when a single connection or a few flows monopolize the queue space, preventing the other connections from finding room in the queue. The "full queue" problem refers to the tendency of the drop-on-full policies to maintain the queues at or near maximum occupancy for long periods of time. Lockout causes unfairness of resource usage, while steady-state long queues result in a longer delay.
To circumvent the two problems mentioned above, an active queue management (AQM) techniques which drops the packets before a queue becomes full, must be used. This allows the routers to control the time and number of packets to drop. Packet dropping or marking at routers, in fact, represents the ability of the router to deal with congestion monitoring, which is resolved by applying AQM techniques [4] . A potential example for AQM is RED [2] and its enhanced versions Stabilized RED (SRED) [5] and adaptive RED [6] or probably other, newly developed AQM techniques (e.g., BLUE [7] , Random Exponential Marking (REM) [8] , and GREEN [9] Although AQM techniques may control an anomalous congestion by dropping users' packets at every single ingress edge [2] , these techniques are unable to detect and prevent the source of the anomalous congestion. If the source of the anomalous congestion is from an attacker or service abuser, AQM techniques are not capable to drop only the packets sent by that attacker or service abuser. Instead, AQM techniques will drop the congestion packets of all network users at the router queue. This leads to a high rate of false positive errors as packets of legal users will be dropped as well. This may also result in the denial of full service to legal users. This paper proposes a technique for detecting and avoiding anomalous congestion at the network gateways. In particular, this paper avoids anomalous congestion by identifying misbehaving users responsible for the congestion. Misbehaving users are identified by monitoring their packet transfer rates (PTR). A user with PTR ratio greater than its bandwidth ratio predefined in the service level agreement (SLA) is identified as a misbehaving user. Thus, anomalous congestion is detected and avoided by dropping packets of misbehaving users while allowing packets of other users to send to their destinations. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related works. Section 3 presents the proposed technique of anomalous congestion avoidance. Section 4 describes the experimental setup and discusses the obtained results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the main findings of this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There are several recent studies that discuss AQM techniques designed for early congestion notification. These AQM techniques can be classified as techniques that are based on queues, on rates, or on concurrent queues and rate metrics. Queue based AQM techniques monitor the queue average and they focus on maintaining the stability of the queue length. The drawbacks of queue-based techniques include backlogs caused by the control mechanism that can be responsible for significant queue delays and parameter settings while operating in traffic.
Rate-based techniques are designed to lessen the differences between enqueuing and dequeuing. These techniques also reduce the losses, delays, and application of high link. Generally speaking, active queue management cuts average queuing delays thus improving throughput, but full queue tradeoffs are required to achieve the best performance. Small queues lead to reduced end to end delays but will decrease the throughput [10] . This study focused on mitigating queue congestion using a RED technique thus the following section will review RED-based techniques and review their limitations.
Authors in [11] measured the performance of RED and Drop Tail algorithms. Their results revealed that the RED algorithm performed better than the Drop Tail algorithm in terms of throughput and fairness8. In a similar study [12] , the RED and Drop Tail algorithms are combined. Their modified Drop Tail algorithm resulted in less packet loss compared to using only the RED or unmodified Drop Tail. They suggested that network congestion could be avoided by incorporating their modified Drop Tail algorithm.
A modified Drop Tail algorithm is not the only algorithm that could outperform the RED algorithm. In a study conducted in [13] , a BLUE algorithm performed better than a RED algorithm, especially when dealing with heavily loaded networks. They also found that the size of the queue is difficult to stabilize using RED and the configuration of the parameters in RED were challenging when faced with high load rates. Another related study conducted in [14] discovered that if a BLUE algorithm is combined with explicit congestion notification (ECN), the resulting algorithm will outperform a RED algorithm in very active gateways. The changing of the round-trip time (RTT) values for the BLUE and RED algorithms were compared as was the impact of using ECN when there was heavy traffic. They observed that the RED algorithm lost control of the queue when there was a large, active flow. Bahri and Sema noted that losses can be reduced by using ECN [14] . Using both the BLUE algorithm and ECN lead to control over the queue and reduced losses at gateways with heavy flows. They recommended using ECN to improve the performance of the BLUE algorithm.
The CHOKe algorithm was proposed in [15] to control unresponsive flows. The results of their study revealed that RED, Drop Tail, and CHOKe algorithms all provided high link utilization but only the CHOKe algorithm had the ability to recognize and penalize unresponsive flows. All three algorithms could calculate the overhead for incoming packets but each algorithm had different space requirements. The CHOKe algorithm was the only algorithm to achieved fairness.
In situations where the average queue size is greater than the maximum threshold, the RED algorithm is recommended to manage network congestion. However, packets may still be dropped even if they are responsive. A high degree of false positives can occur because normal and misbehaving packets are dropped in the same manner. One of the goals of this study was to improve the selective ability of the RED algorithm so that it would drop only unresponsive packets while send all responsive packets to their destination.
III. ANOMALOUS CONGESTION AVOIDANCE
This paper detects and avoids anomalous congestion through two main phases: network monitoring and anomalous congestion avoidance. The following subsections provide further details about these two phases.
A. Network monitoring
This phase is to monitor network activities at the gateways queues based on RED technique. The RED technique prevents traffic bursts at gateways by monitoring traffic shifts in the average queue size (AQS). Once the AQS of a particular gateway exceeds a predefined threshold, RED notifies the users connected to that edge to reduce the volume of sent packets. The RED algorithm computes the AQS for every packet received at the gateway queue by using a low-pass filter algorithm that uses the exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) technique described in [16] [17] [18] . According to [2] , the RED policy uses the EWMA technique to smooth possible short-term increases in queue size (QS) that result from normal traffic bursts or from transitory congestion, thus resulting in a significant increase in the AQS. Therefore, the AQS of the burst gateway is calculated as follows:
where q is the instantaneous buffer size of the gateway queue, and wq is an exponential weight coefficient that defines the time of the low-pass filter with a ratio much less than one. The AQS is then compared with the maxth and minth thresholds of RED algorithm. If the calculated AQS is less than minth, all packets are allowed to pass to the destination. However, if the value of the AQS is greater than the maxth, the packets are marked to drop. In between, every received packet is marked with an RED-notification in commensurate probability. In this paper, RED-notifications are indications for network congestion.
B. Anomalous Congestion Avoidance
This phase is to detect anomalous congestion by measuring PTR of network users. PTR fraction of every user is measured to verify if the consumed ratio exceeds the ratio guaranteed in the SLA. PTR of notified user (N-user) at each ingress edge can be adequately measured by counting the average number of packets generated by a user. According to [19] [20] , the PTR can be accurately measured by multiplying the total generated packets with packet size. Thus, the bandwidth consumed by every notified user is computed by measuring the PTR of that user at each ingress edge:
where avg_sent i N-user is the average packets sent by the Nuser at ingress edge i, and t is the time interval. The avg_sent i N-user calculated at every edge router is reported to a central unit of SLA management (SLA-unit). The SLA-unit provides a technique for managing the detection of anomalous congestion. This unit computes the average ratios of the PTR for N-user on the basis of user details gathered from various ingress edges; therefore, anomalous congestion is differentiated from normal congestion by recognizing misbehaving users who exceed the SLA bit rate of the PTR. The SLA-unit is a central unit taking decisions based on congestion reports received from distributed RED gateways as illustrated in For every N-user, the total number of PTR is computed by aggregating the PTR fractions at the SLA-unit. To compare the PTR measured ratios with the SLA bandwidth shares and resolve the decision of PTR violations, the SLA-unit transfers the total PTRN-user to percentile ratios by using the following formula:
where BandwidthLink is the domain links bandwidth. Therefore, the SLA-unit compares the PTR percentile of Nuser with the SLA bandwidth share to detect possible anomalous congestion. User that consumes PTR higher than the bandwidth share in the SLA is misbehaving users. The SLA-unit then sends notification packets to all ingress edges to filter the traffic of that user as source of anomalous congestion. Users within the bandwidth ratio guaranteed in the SLA are victims and their traffic is allowed to reach their destinations. Fig 2 shows the main steps of the proposed technique of detecting and avoiding the anomalous congestion on the network gateways. 
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
This section describes the experiment settings and discusses the obtained results.
A. Experiment Setup
A simulation experiment was conducted by using a network simulator NS-2.35. As shown in Fig. 3 , the network topology is composed of 47 nodes [35 edge routers (E1-E35) and 12 core routers (CR1-CR12)]. Network traffic is FTP over TCP traffic generated by 70 end-users (U1-U70). Each user could use several active sources to send several flows through one or more ingress edges. Each of the five edges was gathered as a fivefold set; likewise, each of the 10 end-users was gathered to obtain a denary set. Each end-user could send its data through one fivefold set of ingress edges as maximum, and each ingress edge could be used only by one denary set of end-users as maximum. For instance, U1 can send its data through E1, E2, E3, E4, and E5; however, E1 can be used by U1-U10. Further details of the description of user traffic setting, such as volume of traffic actually generated, source, and destination machine, are presented in Table 1 . 
TABLE1. BACKGROUND TRAFFIC SETTING OF END-USERS

End-users
Connected to Destined to N-traffic (Mbps/user)
RED gateways were modified to indicate congestion. Table  2 shows the values of the RED parameters selected to guarantee an efficient calculation of gateway AQSs. The maximum TCP flow windows were 256 and 512 packets, and the maximum packet size was 1024 bytes. QoS ratios guaranteed for end-users was predefined by the SLA. The value of bandwidth metrics specified for every end-users is 20% of link bandwidth. The simulated experiment lasted for 100 s. 
B. Result and discussion
In this simulated experiment, network traffic was monitored under light load and traffic burst. Light load was observed at 0-9 and 86-100 s. Within these periods, end-users did not consume more than their bandwidth share; therefore, the network was properly provisioned. Traffic burst was observed at 10-85 s, when congestions were generated and the link bandwidth could no longer accommodate all user traffic. Within this period, six mutual anomalous congestions were simulated as malicious traffic increased from 1 Mbps to more than 10 Mbps. In this experiment, malicious traffic is generated as constant bit rate (CBR). Fig. 3 illustrates from which ingress edges the malicious traffic was injected and for which edges the malicious traffic was intended. Table 3 presents details of this malicious traffic and the users that generated it. It is worth mentioning that experiment was run several times. In this experiment, the mean values across several test repetitions are reported. The mean values of the test repetitions were also normalized to draw general conclusion about the findings of this study.
1) Congestion Monitoring
This scenario demonstrates the ability of the RED technique to recognize Msb-user traffic in the network gateways. It also demonstrates the ability of the proposed technique to filter different types of traffic and exclude the misbehaving ones.
TABLE3. DETAILS OF SIMULATED CONGESTIONS
In Fig. 4 , the gateways e1-e15 and e26-e30 of AQS between 15 and 45 packets marked packets of U1-U30 and U50-U60 with ECN notifications in the period (6s to 87s) which is the period of anomalous congestion. 
2) Anomalous Congestion Avoidance
We showed that only users whose traffic was classified as misbehaving traffic violated the SLA. Thus, the PTR measurement was required only for the traffic of 40 users, not 70. Using the passive model, the PTRs of Msb-user were measured at the ingress edges using Formula (2) and reported to the SLA-unit. The SLA-unit used the reported PTR fractions to calculate the total PTR ratio of each Msb-user using Formula (3). Thereafter, the total PTR ratios were used to compute the link bandwidth consumption percentage of each Msb-user using Formula (4). The computed PTR percentages were compared with the preset SLA thresholds to differentiate malicious from legitimate users. Fig. 5 shows the link bandwidth percentages consumed by every Msb-user. This implies that U10, U12, U15, U25, U30, and U55 were malicious users who caused the anomalous congestion. Consequently, the excessive traffic sent by these malicious users was dropped as malicious traffic. Conversely, other Msbusers were all victims plundered by the malicious users of U10, U12, U15, U25, U30, and U55. This paper proposes a technique to detect and avoid anomalous congestion at the network gateways. In particular, the proposed technique enhances the existing AQMs technique in terms of differentiating between normal and anomalous congestion. The findings of this paper demonstrates the significance of identifying the misbehaving users (source of anomalous congestion) to avoid drooping traffic of legitimate users. The simulation results show that calculating PTRs of every misbehaving user and comparing it with its bandwidth ratio predefined in the SLA helps to distinguish between legitimate and malicious users. By identifying the malicious users who are behind the anomalous congestion, the proposed technique could efficiently avoid dropping traffic of legitimate users. The proposed technique however has a limitation of scalability. As SLA-unit is a central unit, it may vulnerable for single point of failure especially with large-scale network. A future study can be conducted to address this limitation through proposing a distributed method for gathering PTRs of network users and verifying SLA violations without using central unit. 
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